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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ever, the courts generally have been disinclined to utilize this power
in cases of improper remarks because of the severity of the penalty.
See Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Miscon-
duct of Attorneys, 52 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1039 (1952). Perhaps a com-
promise method could be found in contempt proceedings which
would make available a wide range of sanctions. Contempt is a
flexible, easily applied discipline, and has in fact been used to deter
attorneys in both civil and criminal cases. See e.g., Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Pace v. United States, 386 U.S. 155 (1949).
J. o. F.
Dm cEs-Loss oF EARNINGs-FEDEFA INCOmE TAx.-Action
by administrator for wrongful death of decedent who was pas-
senger in defendant's auto which collided at intersection with
truck driven by one codefendant and owned by defendant truck
line. Held, that trial court properly instructed jury to consider
offsetting factor of probable income taxes on decedent's probable
lifetime net earnings in assessing reasonable compensation for loss
caused by destruction of decedent's earning capacity. Floyd v.
Fruit Industries, 136 A.2d 918 (Conn. 1957).
The principal case represents an effort on the part of the
forward-looking and learned Connecticut court to advance a prin-
ciple unanswerable-restitutio in integrum-in the face of practical
and mechanical difficulties as well as the prevailing line of authority.
Prior American decisions have conceded that an unjust enrichment
may accrue to the plaintiff when tax liability is not deducted from
personal injury recoveries; however, they have regarded the cal-
culation of future tax liability as too remote and speculative for
submission to a jury. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186
F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951); Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 96 Ohio
App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 366 (1953).
The objections to the principal case may conveniently be
categorized into four groups. First, that consideration of intricate
tax liability is a matter too complex and technical as well as specula-
tive for consideration by a jury. See, e.g., Rouse v. New York C. &
St. L. Ry., 349 III. App. 139, 110 N.E.2d 266 (1953); Stokes v.
United States, 144 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1944). Second, that effective
tax rates in this country fluctuate and the liability of an individual
is governed by such intangibles as age, number and extent of per-
sonal deductions, etc. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Thompson, 368 Mo. 339,
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251 S.W.2d 42 (1952); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry.,
135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1956). Third, res inter alios acta.
The tortfeasor's liability should not be affected by a benefit con-
ferred upon the plaintiff from a collateral source, e.g., continuation
of wages. MAYNE, DAmAGES 151 (11th ed. 1946); Majestic v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 147 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1945). Fourth, the
principal case would impose upon the plaintiff an indirect tax burden
which the legislature will not directly impose. Note, 69 HAv.
L. REv. 1495 (1956).
The first of these objections regarding the speculative character
of future tax liability involves an attempt to weigh factors no more
conjectural than the life expectancy of the plaintiff, his chances to
resume a productive endeavor, or any number of matters inherent
in any personal injury action. Note, 69 HAv. L. REy. 1495 (1956).
Moreover, no responsible person could suggest that evidence con-
cerning the future tax liability of the plaintiff would be more tech-
nical or complex than the testimony of many orthopedic surgeons.
The fact that tax rates fluctuate and the tax liability of the
plaintiff is subject to the extent of his personal deductions is a
more formidable objection. However, even this problem disappears
when deducting income tax from estimated prior earnings, which
tax may be calculated with great precision. Moreover, there is
nothing uncertain or remote about the incidence of future federal
income tax, only the rates are subject to speculation. It may fairly
be stated that the tax rates and extent of personal deductions are
no more indeterminate than the posture of an individuals overall
future earning potential. The attempt on the part of a jury to
resolve the multiplicity of fluid factors involved in the determina-
tion of a lump sum estimate of future earning potential is fraught
with relevant conjectural considerations, all of which are critical
problems. The future tax liability of the plaintiff is no less important.
"The trial of an action for damages is not a scientific inquest into a
mixed sequence of phenomena, or of an historical investigation of
the chapter of events... it is a practical inquiry." Weld-Blumdell v.
Stephens, (1920) A.C. 986. As a practical man and a federal income
taxpayer, the average juror is profoundly aware of the concept of
"take home pay" and the incidence of federal income taxes. Morris,
Should Juries in Personal Injury Cases Be Instructed That Plaintiff's
Recoveries Are Not Income Within the Meaning of Federal Tav
Laws?, 3 DmFN E CouNsEL J. 3 (1958). Therefore, any "practical
inquiry" into the loss suffered upon the destruction of earning
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capacity should take cognizance of the fact that: "For all practical
purposes, the only usable earnings are net earnings after payment
of such taxes." Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 136 A.2d 918, 925 (1957).
The objection that the tax liability of a plaintiff is res inter
alios acta, is specious; the assessment of damages often involves
matters res inter alios acta. When a business or professional man's
earning capacity is destroyed, the courts do not base recovery upon
gross income, but deduct the expenses of rent, salaries, etc., to
arrive at his net income and properly measure his actual loss.
Jegen v. Berger, 77 Cal. App. 2d 1, 174 P.2d 489 (1956); Mason,
Damages and Income Tax, 4 Busmxss L. 13Ev. 242, 249 (1957).
Likewise, a person with the most limited knowledge of accounting
concepts can readily appreciate the necessity of deducting income
tax liability to arrive at the projected net earning capacity and
hence, the projected net loss to be compensated. The aforemen-
tioned well-known expenditures are no less inter alios acta than
the liability of an individual to pay income taxes. All such out-
goings must be considered.
The last objection-that the principal case imposes a tax
burden that the Congress has declined to impose directly-is, upon
mature reflection, reduced to serious question. To understand this
matter, one must comprehend that the INT. 1Ewv. CoDE oF 1954, §
104(A) (2), puts personal injury recoveries in some category other
than income, by specifically excluding damages for such injuries from
gross income. Wages and salaries are, of course, an essential part
of gross income. What, then, is the distinction between an award
for future earnings and the earnings as they might accrue? The
answer lies in the fact that "recoupment on account of such losses
is not income since it is not derived from capital, from labor or
from both combined." Edward H. Clark, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), citing
Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1920).
When the capacity to earn is destroyed, the reparation is of capital,
not income. The plaintiff is to be compensated for the destruction
of the source giving rise to future income, as sometimes measured
by estimated future income. Indeed, it is well known that the
plaintiff need not be presently employed to recover for the destruc-
tion of future earning capacity. Blacktin v. McCarthy, 42 N.W.2d
542 (Minn. 1957). Prospective gross earnings of an individual as
reduced by his expenses including prospective income taxes, most
accurately reflect the net earning potential of a plaintiff. Com-
pensation of the plaintiff for the destruction of his earning capacity
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can best be effected by the use of future net earnings as the measure
of damages. This method is perfectly consistent with the Internal
Revenue Code exemption of personal injury recoveries, the pur-
pose of which is to avoid taxing as income, that which was already
the plaintiff's: his earning capacity. The consideration of future
tax liability imposes no burden upon the plaintiff; and certainly
not one that Congress has refused to impose directly.
It remains to examine the overwhelming consideration favor-
ing the rule in the principal case.
Restitutio in integrum; upon this canon, hangs most of the
law of damages. The ultimate concern in any personal injury
action must be to measure, as accurately as possible, the harm
sustained by the plaintiff and to compel the defendant to com-
pensate the plaintiff for his injury. In a larger sense, this is the
rationale of the principal case.
Not only the Connecticut court, but also the highest tribunal
of the British Commonwealth, the English House of Lords, has
adopted the position that the future income tax liability of plaintiff
may properly be deducted from an award for future earnings.
British Transport Comm'n v. Gourley, A.C. 185 (2 W.L.R. 41-H.L.),
3 All E.R. 796 (1956). The only tort commentators of any par-
ticular note who have, as yet, expressed themselves on this problem,
have approved the principle put forth in the Gourley and Floyd
cases. "If the plaintiff gets, in tax free damages, an amount on
which he would have had to pay taxes if he had gotten it as wages,
then the plaintiff is getting more than he lost." 2 HARPEa & JAMES,
TORTs § 25.12 (1956).
A distorted view of this subject will, no doubt, lead some to
view the problem from a frame of reference in which a benefit is
conferred on a tort-feasor by allowing him to abate the damages
for which he would otherwise be liable. However, this is no matter
of escape from, or even reduction of liability; rather, the question
is one of accurate assessment of liability. No responsible person
would suggest that the defendant should be compelled to pay
damages over and above that which the plaintiff has actually suf-
fered by reason of the defendant's wrongdoing.
We may only hope that the West Virginia court will not be
susceptible to the maudlin suggestion that consideration of future
income tax liability is a scheme for indemnity companies to escape
liability. R.G.P.
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